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ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF CHATTEL
MORTGAGES *
JOHN McDILL Foxt
A CHATTEL mortgage has been defined frequently, as a con-
ditional sale of personal property as security for a debt. Under
this definition the condition is really a condition subsequent, i.e. the
title has passed and will revest upon the happening of a condition,
namely the payment of the loan secured or the performance of the
obligation secured. Today, however, we have given a technical mean-
ing to the words conditional sale. By those words we define, accord-
ing to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (Chapter 122 Wis. Stat.) "any
contract for the sale of goods, under which possession is delivered to the
buyer and the property in the goods is to vest in the buyer at a subse-
quent time upon the payment of part or all of the price, or upon per-
formance of any other condition, or the happening of any contingency;
or any contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee
or lessee is bound to become or has the option of becoming the owner of
such goods upon full compliance with the terms of the contract."
The common usage of the words chattel mortgage as opposed to con-
ditional sale, especially when defining the legal right, of buyer and seller
is that the seller conveys title to the buyer and the buyer secures the
debt by a chattel mortgage, thereby revesting title for that particular
purpose in the seller, or that the seller retains title in himself as security
and merely gives possession to the buyer. If the transaction is a chattel
mortgage, the mortgage must be foreclosed. If a conditional sale, be-
fore the passage of the present statute, except as to certain goods such
as household furniture, there did not need to be a foreclosure or sale.
Now there is by the terms of the act a compulsory resale by the seller
under the conditions set forth, though it is still possible in a very
modified degree to retake possession under a conditional sale with-
out a resale. Just as in mortgages of real property, so also in chattel
mortgages, parol evidence may come in to show the real nature
of the transaction. If a regular bill of sale is given to secure an in-
debtedness, it is a chattel mortgage. The difficult case is a situation
where there is on the face of the instrument a purported sale with an
option reserved to the vendor of repurchase within a given time. If
certain at least so as to be capable of identification. Thus in Fowler V.
• A continuation of the discussion in the February issue.
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this is merely a device to do away with the necessity of foreclosure-to
clog the equity of redemption-it may be construed a chattel mortgage.
The test is, if'there was a previous debt which still subsists the trans-
action will be deemed a chattel mortgage.' The usual rule in equity
permitting evidence tending to show a bill of sale absolute on its face
to be a chattel mortgage is well illustrated in the following cases, Lain-
son v. Moffat,2 where what purported to be a lease was construed to be
a chattel mortgage, Bertschy v. Bank of Sheboygan,3 where a bill of
sale was construed to be a chattel mortgage, Salter v. Bank of Eau
Claire,4 and where the same situation was presented. This last cited
case illustrates a principle of foreclosure by sale as well as the previous
rule. A mortgage of a crop thereafter to be raised is absolutely void
as against subsequent purchasers unless the mortgagee took possession
before the purchase. See Lamson v. Moffat, supra, and cases there
cited. A chattel mortgage of a stock of goods in trade where there is
a verbal agreement that the mortgagor may retain possession, sell the
goods and apply the proceeds to the support of himself and family is
void,5 as is also such a mortgage where such provision is incorporated
as one of the terms of the mortgage itself" and even where the mortgage
purports to cover after acquired property and permits the sale of stock
and covers additions to stock it seems that there must be a provision in
the mortgage itself as to what disposition is to be made of the proceeds
of sales over and above the additions or at least filing in accordance
with the statute.i A chattel mortgage of personal property exempt
from seizure and sale upon execution is of course, by the provisions
of the statute, invalid unless the same be signed by the wife of the per-
son taking the same (if he be a married man and his wife at the time
be a member of his family) and unless the signature of the wife be
witnessed by two witnesses 8 though creditors cannot attack it because
of the wife's failure to sign.9
The property described in the chattel mortgage must be definite and
Rockwell v. Humphrey, 57 Wis. 410, 15 N.W. 394.
Musgat v. Pumpelly, 46 Wis. 66o, i N.W. 410.
'6I Wis. 249, 21 N.W. 62.
'89 Wis. 473, 61 N.W. 1115.
'97 Wis. 84, 72 N.W. 352.
'Steinert v. Deuster, 23 Wis. 136.
6Place v. Longworthy, 13 Wis. 629.
SDurr v. Wildish, io8 Wis. 401, 84 N.W. 437.
Eastuan v. Parkinsom, 133 Wis. 375, 113 N.W. 649.
Roundy v. Converse, 71 Wis. 524, 37 N.W. 811.
'Wis Stat. 241.o8; Lashna v. Myhre, 117 Wis. iS, 93 N.W, 8II.
Clinninghain v. Brictson, 10I Wis. 378, 77 N.W. 729.
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Hunt0 the language was "The entire stock in trade and the fixtures of
the said William Wetzel, consisting of clocks, watches, chains, show
cases, jewelry, and all goods included in his stock, tools, and material
excepting one safe, one regulator, one astronomical clock, two musical
clocks and stock in trade to the amount of two hundred dollars." The
court held the mortgage void for uncertainty, and quoted with approval
from Herman on Chattel Mortgages "in order to transfer the right of
property in goods or chattels, the chattel intended to be conveyed must
be ascertained and identified at the time of the execution of the instru-
ment." Nevertheless when such a mortgage is given and the mortgagor
subsequently delivers property as conforming to the mortgage and the
mortgagee takes full possession of it this cures the defective de-
scription."
The mortgagee is entitled to the possession of the mortgaged chattels
immediately upon the execution of the mortgage if there be no express
or implied condition to the contrary.' 2 "It is the settled law in this
state" said Cassody J., in the last cited case "that the mortgagee of
chattels has the legal title to the property before the debt is due and
that he may take immediate possession thereof, unless by express stipu-
lation the mortgagor is permitted to retain possession." Likewise it is
held that "a mortgagee of chattels, who is authorized by the instrument
to take possession at any time he may deem himself insecure, may de-
mand the property at any time, and upon refusal of the mortgagor to
deliver it he may maintain replevin therefor." Where possession is
permitted to remain with the mortgagor, and a clause permits the
mortgagee to take possession whenever he may deem himself insecure,
or words of similar import, it is immaterial whether his apprehended in-
security be reasonable or not. It is equivalent to giving the mortgagee
the right to immediate possession whenever he may choose to de-
mand it.'-
" Fowler v. Hunt, 48 Wis. 345, 4 N.W. 481.
"Frost v. Citizens National Bank of Beloit, 68 Wis. 234, 32 N.W. Iio.
"Hill v. Merrinan, 72 Wis. 483, 4o N.W. 399.
"Gage v. Wayland, 67 Wis. 566, 31 N.W. iO8; Huebner v. Koebke, 42 Wis.
